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Criminal Law:
Taking the Constitution Seriously? Three Approaches to Law’s
Competence in Addressing Authority and Professionalism
Hadar Aviram1
Introduction
The post-Warren Court’s routine findings of constitutional
compliance by law enforcement, the courtroom apparatus, and
correctional agencies are of no surprise to anyone studying the American
criminal process. Legal realists have long come to regard doctrinal
niceties as tools that render legitimacy to intrusive, abusive, and punitive
state practices.2
But upon closer examination, the Supreme Court’s usage of
constitutional standards as a way to “kosherize” inferior defense quality,3
prosecutorial misconduct,4 and correctional abuses,5 as well as policing
practices,6 prosecutorial discretion,7 and plea-bargain abuses,8 merits
deeper attention. When the Supreme Court expresses deference to
authority, relying on a particular standard of review and making that
standard the issue rather than the rights violation in the particular case,9
does it “believe” in what it says, or is it cynically exploiting
constitutional doctrine to garner legitimacy? And if the Constitution is
more than mere window dressing to advance the interests of the
powerful, in what ways is it “real”?
To answer these questions, I juxtapose two common approaches to
criminal-courtroom policy: the legal-model approach and the
sociological-empirical approach. Each approach offers a valuable
1. Lightly edited and adapted from Hadar Aviram, Taking the Constitution
Seriously? Three Approaches to Law’s Competence in Addressing Authority and
Professionalism, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING (Sharon Dolovich &
Alexandra Natapoff eds. 2017).
2. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
3. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
4. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
5. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1872).
6. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
7. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
8. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
9. See Sharon Dolovich, Canons of Evasion in Constitutional Criminal Law, in
THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 111 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds.
2017).
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interpretation of legal policies and goals, emphasizing certain factors that
account for legal practices in the field; however, each of them fails to
account for other factors, thus incompletely explicating the criminal
process. I then use Niklas Luhmann’s Systems Theory as a third
approach that takes both the Constitution and its limitations seriously. As
I argue, systems theory complements doctrinal analysis and sociolegal
critique by showing how the very nature of constitutional
communications limits their usefulness for criminal-justice reform.
The Legal-Model Approach: The Constitution as a Value Choice
One perspective on the post-Warren Court’s forgiving approach
toward the criminal-justice apparatus views the Constitution as a vehicle
for advancing one set of legal values over another. A convenient starting
point is Herbert Packer’s “Two Models of the Criminal Process.”10
Analyzing the Warren Court revolution as it was occurring, Packer
transcended the government/defendant dichotomy that dominated
contemporary discourse, arguing that the due process revolution
consisted of a shift along a continuum between two “ideal types.” On one
end lay the Crime Control Model, which prioritized efficiency,
advocating for reliance on police and prosecution powers under the
assumption that any defendant that made it past these checks into the trial
system was “presumptively guilty.” This model relied on bargaining and
finality and shied away from trials and appeals. On the other end lay the
Due Process Model, which prioritized avoidance of wrongful
convictions, treating the criminal justice apparatus with suspicion and
allowing for constitutional challenges and ample post-conviction
review.11 Charles Whitebread and Christopher Slobogin argue for a
subsequent pendulum swing back toward Crime Control in the postWarren-Court era, identifying four themes: a focus on factual
guilt/innocence, echoing Packer’s “presumption of guilt,” a shift from
bright-line constitutional rules to flexible, “totality of the circumstances”
tests, greater belief in the integrity of the police and prosecution, and
greater deference to state courts.12 Packer himself, a due-process

10. HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
11. Elsewhere, I have argued that due process has two aspects, formalism and
fairness. See Hadar Aviram, Packer in Context: Formalism and Fairness in the Due
Process Model, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 237 (2011).
12. CHARLES WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 4-5 (5th ed. 2008).

2018]

The Judges’ Book

43

enthusiast, expressed on his deathbed in the early 1970s disillusionment
with the Warren Court’s project.
Many have used Packer’s models as a springboard for suggesting
their own models, which were regarded as preferable or more realistic
representations of the criminal process. But even Packer’s analysis,
which imbues the Court’s constitutional stance with a more nuanced
worldview than mere partisanship, is fraught with the naïveté of what
Hunt and Wickham call the “intellectual insularity” of legal
scholarship.13 For Packer, whether the justices subscribe to crime control
or due process, they are still, in good faith, applying universal principles
to specific cases by classifying real-life situations into preexisting legal
“ideal types,” which they apply universally and objectively.14 This
approach does not see the Court as a political institution embedded in the
broader socioeconomic, racial and political context.
Packer would perceive the examples from the Court listed above as a
manifestation of the crime-control model. Creating and reinforcing low
expectations from defense attorneys is a vote of confidence not only in
public defense but also in the initial screening process by the police and
the prosecution; if a case has made it to trial, the defendant is likely
guilty anyway, and guaranteeing the quality of his defense is less crucial.
This approach explains not only the performance prong of Strickland but
also its prejudice prong: the defendant was probably rightfully convicted,
and, therefore, any post-conviction debate about defense flaws is moot.
Similarly, Batson and McClesky can be explained as a crime-control
expression of faith in the system’s fairness; the defendant’s probable
guilt makes the possibility of racial bias less worrisome. Both of these
scenarios, as well as the third—the case of correctional practices—also
strongly indicate the Courts’ crime-control commitment to finality and
impatience for postconviction inquiries.
But these three cases also expose the weaknesses of a Packerian
approach as the ultimate path to understanding the post-Warren Court.
Why does the Court place such trust in public defense? Does the Court’s
faith in the system’s ability to overcome errors override what the justices
surely know about racial discrimination and minority overrepresentation?
And how does the Court benefit from its wholesale support of
correctional practices?

13. ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAW: TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF
LAW AS GOVERNANCE 40 (1994).
14. David Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short and Happy Life of the Law and
Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1990).
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Finally, the Packerian approach lacks historical sensitivity. It tells us
little about why the Warren Court shifted from crime control to due
process and why the pendulum has swung back. These questions are
better addressed by the second approach.
Sociolegal Approaches: The Constitution in Service of
Institutional Legitimacy and Political Entrenchment
The second approach is more frequently espoused by social scientists
examining the criminal process, often using empirical tools. For
simplification purposes, this approach encompasses various perspectives
that see the Court as one of many sociopolitical institutions, with
pragmatic concerns, interests, and obligations beyond adherence to a set
of values promoted by constitutional provisions.
I identify two strains within the sociolegal approach. The first
focuses on factors endogenous to the criminal process and on the Court’s
role as an institution within the system. Such works advocate rejecting
the notion of the system as a rational apparatus with a single goal in
mind, opting instead to see it as constructed of many individuals with
different and often conflicting roles, and handling a variety of
professional, administrative and personal constraints.15 While this
literature emerges mostly from lower-court ethnographies, it is
nonetheless relevant to the conversation about the Supreme Court in that
it draws attention to the “real” reasons why the Court accommodates
incompetent lawyers and thinly veiled, racially motivated jury selection
tactics. The Supreme Court affirms the experiences of state judges who
routinely encounter the “repeat players” in the system: defense attorneys
and prosecutors.16 Since the continued collaboration of these participants
is essential to keep the wheels of the criminal justice machine turning,
their interests are accommodated at the expense of those of the
defendants, who are “one-shotters.” This principle holds for federal
litigation of state correctional practices: The court is well aware of the
need to procure the state’s collaboration, and therefore gears itself more
toward conciliatory compromises and consent decrees.17

15. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979); Malcolm Feeley, Two Models of the Criminal Justice
System: An Organizational Approach, 7 L. & SOC’Y REV. 407 (1972).
16. See JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE (1977); PETER
NARDULLI ET AL., TENOR OF JUSTICE (1988).
17. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE (1991).
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This literature is particularly useful regarding ineffective assistance
of counsel claims because in that situation, the defense attorneys’
interests line up with those of the court and against their clients.
Described in early examples of this literature as “con men” who trick
their clients into pleading guilty to save everyone’s time,18 the lawyers
quickly develop proficiency in identifying prototypes of cases—“normal
crimes”—and perfect ways of negotiating for pleas based on these
generalizations.19
The second strain examines the creation and administration of the
criminal project as a product of the larger social structure, focusing on its
reinforcement of patterns of power and inequality. Works by Marxist
social historians and conflict criminologists address the emergence of
laws aimed mainly at controlling and oppressing disenfranchised
populations, mostly by criminalizing their behavior, such as vagrancy
and poaching—crimes created and enforced to protect the property
interests of powerful social groups. Similarly, such accounts highlight
the stratifying effect of drug policy, death penalty enforcement, and the
deliberate choices involved in the criminal prosecution of slaves in the
American South. The emergence of penal practices, often shrouded in
therapeutic, ostensibly benevolent reforms, is also interpreted as systemic
support for oppression.20
Scholars disagree on the level of autonomy they ascribe to law
within the power structure. Instrumental Marxists go as far as to claim
that law is entirely subservient to the mode of production.21 Structural
Marxists espouse a more nuanced approach, acknowledging that law
retains a certain level of autonomy; rather than automatically supporting
the interests of power groups, the law sometimes offers hope to weaker
groups, thus maintaining its appearance of universal and equal

18. Abraham Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game:
Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & SOC’Y REV. 15 (1967).
19. David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a
Public Defender Office, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255 (1965).
20. E.g., TONY PLATT, THE TRIUMPH OF BENEVOLENCE: THE ORIGINS OF THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1972); DAVID ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE
AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA
(1980); JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE
UNDERCLASS, 1890-1990 (1993).
21. GEORG RUSCHE & OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
(1939).
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application and guaranteeing that, in the long run, the power structure
will prevail.22
These approaches clearly support the observation that the Court
obtains legitimacy by supporting the interests of power groups. For
example, by supporting the fiction of adequate criminal representation
via the “effective assistance of counsel” test, the Court justifies abusive
and punitive practices. The defense attorney’s presence becomes a fig
leaf behind which injustices can hide. Similarly, the façade of racial
blindness diverts attention from the myriad racialized practices in the
criminal process. And finally, the assertion that inmates are being
punished for their crimes—with all practices associated with their
incarceration conveniently labeled as “punishment” and “not
punishment”—masks the severe deprivation of fellow humans’ basic
material, social, and medical needs. Even the sporadic exceptions to this
pattern of finding counsel’s assistance to be adequate23 nevertheless
conform to this overall paradigm. This handful of exceptions creates an
illusionary impression of equality and justice, numbing us to the robust
body of opposite decisions.
The problem with this approach is its non-falsifiability. When the
Court rules for the state, we ascribe that to its support of the existing
power structure. When it rules in favor of the defendants or inmates, we
ascribe that to the need to maintain false consciousness and legitimacy.
Only when the abuse of power is so blatant that a pro-government
decision would cause outrage does the Court shy away from it and give a
handout to the disenfranchised. The extent to which the Court succeeds
in predicting the reaction to its rulings is an index of its political
astuteness.
But even if it is profitable for the Supreme Court to support the
system at the expense of the disenfranchised and downtrodden, why is
the Constitution such a convenient vehicle? If the Constitution is such a
powerful legitimizing tool, why is its ability to provide satisfying
solutions to real problems so limited?

22. Alan Stone, The Place of Law in the Marxian Structure-Superstructure
Archetype, 19 L. & SOC’Y REV. 39 (1985).
23. E.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376
(2012); Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
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A Third Approach: The Constitution and Its Interpretation as an Index of
How Law Treats Authority and Professionalism
The third approach transcends the doctrinal insularity of the
Packerian perspective, as well as the dismissiveness toward law, and the
Constitution, of the sociolegal perspective. While the legal or political
consequences of the Court’s approach matter, of course, this approach
examines the issue through a discursive lens: How does law, in itself,
think? This “discursive perspective”24 focuses not on the ontological
nature of reality, but on the role of the Constitution in propagating a
given view of reality. It helpfully illuminates law as a system without
cynically sacrificing the importance of law itself to the result.
For our purposes, the relevant aspect of systems theory, as espoused
by Niklas Luhmann, is its concern with law’s boundaries, selfproduction, and relationship with external structures.25 The unit of
analysis for the theory is a “communication.” Luhmann defines “law” as
a set of legal communications, which converse with each other and refer
to each other. It is through these communications that law attains a
“mind” and a perspective independent from, and unrelated to, that of
human legal actors. What distinguishes legal and non-legal
communications is their function: the maintenance (stabilization) of
expectations (e.g., that actors in the criminal justice system will
adequately represent defendants, guarantee racial neutrality, and treat
inmates decently) in the face of disappointments (e.g., an unprofessional
lawyer, a racially-biased jury, or an abusive prison warden). The main
distinction made by legal communications in respect to these behaviors is
the legal/illegal dichotomy.26 The communications which determine
which behaviors will be deemed “legal” and which will be regarded as
“illegal” are contingent upon the concept of justice, which often
manifests itself through equality (the equal/unequal distinction).
These distinctions made by the system’s communications and
operations are exclusive to the system. Law, like other systems, is an
autopoietic system, in which “everything that is used as a unit by the
system is produced by the system itself.”27 Since the system consists of
24. NIELS ÅKERSTRØM ANDERSEN, DISCURSIVE ANALYTICAL STRATEGIES:
UNDERSTANDING FOUCAULT, KOSELLECK, LACLAU, LUHMANN (2003).
25. NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 47 (2004).
26. Jean Clam, The Specific Autopoiesis of Law: Between Derivative Autonomy and
Generalised Paradox, in LAW’S NEW BOUNDARIES: THE CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL
AUTOPOIESIS (Jiri Priban & David Nelken eds. 2001).
27. ANDERSEN, supra note 24.
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communications, and the communications use distinctions unique to law,
it can only converse with itself, using its own terms and distinctions.28
Importantly, as a self-sufficient, self-perpetuating system, law supplies
its own legitimacy using internal tools and referring back to them for
validity.29
Law, argues Luhmann, operates in a universe of systems, and
addresses questions that come up in other systems. These questions,
however, do not translate well across systems, because systems are
cognitively open but operationally closed to each other; they can
communicate about each other but not directly to each other. Whenever a
system is irritated by an external event, or an external perspective from a
different discipline, a structural coupling between the two systems may
occur: the first system may choose, through its own operations and
distinctions, to select the second system; the first system then
communicates about the second system using the first system’s own
distinctions, vocabulary and inner logic.
Law’s form of operative closure is normative closure; while
maintaining cognitive openness, and being exposed to other systems
through the cases presented to the system or the operation of political
institutions that surround it, law chooses to assimilate issues and events
based on its fundamental legal/illegal distinction.
When the Constitution is irritated by evidence of unprofessional
defense attorneys, racial biases, or cruel and indifferent jailers, it has to
translate this evidence to a question it can comprehend and answer.
These big problems have to be reduced to binary questions—namely,
whether a given practice with which the system is confronted falls above
or below a certain threshold—before they can be addressed by legal
communications.
Note the systemic poverty of the Court’s approach in the criminaljustice examples and its inadequacy in capturing and addressing them
properly. Effective assistance of counsel—or, more clearly put, whether
counsel performance is legal/illegal in the sense that it falls beneath some
minimum threshold—is a very limited way to address quality,
professionalism, agency, budget constraints, and any other issue
stemming from the dark side of Gideon. Similarly, a deep conversation
about the ways in which racism affects the criminal process is translated
to the impoverished, limited binary question whether the outcome was
28. Michael King, You Have to Start Somewhere, in CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND
TRADITIONAL VALUES 3 (G. Douglas & L. Sebba eds. 1998).
29. Stanley Fish, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in THE FATE OF LAW
(A. Sarat & T. R. Kearns. eds. 1991).
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legal/illegal, decided based on whether it was unequal enough to fall
beneath the legality threshold. And broad questions about our trust in the
humanity and professionalism of correctional staff, which could raise
issues of causality and situational dynamics,30 are translated to the
impoverished, limited binary question whether the treatment of the
inmates was legal/illegal in the sense that it fell beneath a minimum
threshold of conditions.
In these three situations, and many more, the Constitution has to
consider (or confront) questions to which it is cognitively open: What
professionalism means, how professionalism affects justice, and how
professionalism may be promoted. But its limitations and internal rules
mean that it can only converse about these issues (and not with other
systems that might tackle these questions differently) in a normatively
closed way, that is, through its binary threshold framework.
This also explains another discontent with the Court’s approach:
setting constitutional standards not only “kosherizes” current practices,
but also acts as a barrier to future litigation. Law’s self-referential
qualities ensure that the next time an irritant invades the legal
conversation, it will refer back to itself, its usual modes of understanding
and decision, and its operative rules, in providing an answer. This
limitation is built into the world of constitutional communications.
Conclusion
One possible way to analyze the three approaches is to regard the
legal approach as what judges say they do, the sociolegal approach as
what judges do, and the systems-theory approach as what the interaction
between the constitution and the outside world does. Systems theory
cannot provide a prescriptive mandate to judges, nor can it blur, in itself,
the line between the constitution and the realities of the criminal process.
What systems theory offers us is a modicum of modesty when
expecting great things from the courts. If what we need are better defense
attorneys, juries, and correctional officers, hanging our hopes on the
flawed instrument of constitutional communication will prove hollow
indeed.

30. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE
(1974).
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